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U.S. Strategic Forces

General

With the end of the Cold War between the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the United States, the threat of an all-out nuclear attack has diminished. It is unlikely that Russia would undertake a massive first strike against the United States, and both countries have significantly reduced their nuclear forces. Still, the threat of nuclear war and the spread of nuclear weapons remains, evidenced by the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998. Five other nations admit to having nuclear weapons (their estimated quantity is indicated in parentheses): China (434), France (482), Russia (13,200), the United Kingdom (200) and the United States (15,500). Israel is known to have the capability to deploy nuclear weapons, and still other countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, are known to have nuclear weapons programs[1].

Nuclear forces continue to play a critical role in the defense of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible capabilities to deter a wide range of threats, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and large-scale conventional military force. Nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets important to achieve strategic and political objectives.

According to Joint Publication 1-02, deterrence is understood as “the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. It is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction”[2].

The Nuclear Triad

The offensive capability of the United States rests on what is known as the Nuclear Triad, comprised of strategic bombers, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It was devised so if any one of the three “legs” is destroyed by an attack, the other two can still function[3].

The United States maintains B-52, Rockwell B-1B, and Northrop Grumman B-2 bombers capable of being armed with nuclear weapons as part of its strategic force.

The U.S. land-based ICBM force consists of Minuteman III ICBMs capable of carrying three warheads apiece and 50 Peacekeeper missiles, each deploying 10 warheads[4].

Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with long-range SLBMs will assume a greater share of the strategic nuclear deterrence mission if Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) is implemented. Under START II, the SLBM force will provide about half of the 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads the United States will be permitted to deploy. SSBNs, which are very hard to detect when at sea, are the most survivable element of the strategic nuclear triad. A significant portion of the SSBN fleet is at sea at any given time, and all submarines not in the shipyard for long-term maintenance can be deployed during a crisis. The U.S. SSBN fleet consists of 19 Ohio-class submarines. No new SSBNs or SLBMs are currently under development[5].

The New Triad[6]

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001 concluded that deterrence should not be limited to the threat of retaliation, nor rely exclusively on nuclear forces. The U.S. will need a broader range of capabilities to assure friends and foe alike of its resolve. Nuclear forces, moreover, are unsuited to many of the contingencies for which the U.S. prepares. A mix of capabilities, offensive and defensive, nuclear, and conventional is required.

The application of a capabilities-based approach to U.S. nuclear forces has resulted in a decision to transform the existing triad of U.S strategic nuclear forces into a New Triad composed of a diverse portfolio of offensive and defensive, nuclear, and conventional systems. The New Triad is designed to give the President and the SECDEF a broad array of options to address a wide range of possible contingencies.

There are six underlying elements that support the legs of the New Triad: strike capabilities (nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), infrastructure,  planning, command and control,  and intelligence.

Strike Capabilities. Non-nuclear strike capabilities include advanced conventional weapons systems, offensive information operations, and Special Operations Forces. Deployed nuclear strike capabilities include the three legs of the existing strategic triad and theater-based, nuclear-capable dual-role aircraft.

Defenses. Active defenses include ballistic missile defense (BMD) and air defense (AD). Passive defenses include measures that reduce vulnerability through mobility, dispersal, redundancy, deception, concealment, and hardening; warn of imminent attack.

Infrastructure. A responsive infrastructure that can augment U.S. military capabilities in a timely manner provides strategic depth to the New Triad.

Planning. Careful planning will be critical to integrate and balance the three elements of the New Triad. Planning for the New Triad must consider multiple goals, a spectrum of adversaries and contingencies, and the many uncertainties of the security environment.

Command and Control. A reliable, survivable, and robust command and control (C2) system will serve as a critical portion of the New Triad.

Intelligence. “Exquisite” intelligence access to an adversary’s secrets without his knowledge is essential to provide insight into the intentions as well as the capabilities of opponents. Such intelligence should enable the United States to tailor its deterrent strategies to the greatest effect.

The United States plans to reduce its operationally deployed nuclear forces over the next decade to 1,700 to 2,200 warheads, while maintaining the flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the security environment. Reductions are planned through a phased program that eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs, Minuteman III ICBMs, and B-52H and B-2 bombers.

The existing verification regime established by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) that entered into force December 5, 1994 will remain in effect. The U.S. Senate did not provide its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Administration does not support ratification of the CTBT but continues to support observance of the U.S. testing moratorium.

In sum, the U.S. strategy for its strategic forces will be transformed and adapted to meet the challenges of the decades to come. The risks associated with reductions in deployed nuclear warheads will be offset by the development and fielding of non-nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities and a revitalization of the infrastructure. The new strategy puts aside Cold War practices and planning and represents an important step in defense transformation.